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The Politics of Global Competitiveness
A new spirit is abroad in the world – the 
spirit of global competitiveness. It signals 
a turning point in world politics that main-
stream  approaches  cannot  comprehend. 
So it is time to abandon IPE (‘international 
political economy’), shaped as it still is by 
the baleful  influence of the US academy, 
and approach the global political economy 
from the perspective of a renewed classical 
Marxism – a new materialism,  fit  for the 
21st century. 
 The  empirical  observation  that  the 
dynamics of economic, social, political and 
cultural change in the contemporary world 
are increasingly shaped by the pursuit and 
promotion  of  capitalist  competitiveness 
provides the starting point for the research 
programme set out here. Not only are the 
vast  majority  of governments around the 
world  explicitly  pursuing  competitiveness 
in  the  global  capitalist  economy  through 
the  reorientation  of  social  and  economic 
policies,  but  international  organisations 
ranging from the IMF, the World Bank, and 
the regional development banks to the EU, 
the OECD, UNCTAD and the UNDP are all 
busy  urging  governments  everywhere to 
reform the ‘business  climate’  in  order  to 
promote  investment  and  domestic  entre-
preneurship and stimulate competition.
  The  efforts  of  these  organisations  are 
complemented  by and  in some  instances 
pursued through an increasing number of 
old and new civil society actors at global, 
regional, national and local levels, ranging 
from the World Economic Forum (WEF) to 
informal  networks of national  competition 
authorities  and  local  agencies  set  up  in 
cities across the world.
  Crucially, the governments of the leading 
capitalist  economies  in the world  are not 
pursuing  competitiveness  for  themselves 
alone. They are actively promoting it too in 
other countries  and regions  of the global 
economy – in the ‘emerging markets’ and 
low and middle income countries which are 
their present and future competitors. It is 
this  novel  and  distinctive  feature  of  the 
global  political  economy – the systematic 
manner in which governments, along with 
organisations such as the OECD, promote 
competitiveness  far  beyond their  own 
frontiers  –  which  demands  explanation, 
and which is the principal object of enquiry 
of the research programme set out here.
  Why is it  that  the governments  of the 
leading  capitalist  economies,  and  inter-
national organisations such as the OECD or 
regional  associations such as the EU, are 
not  only  pursuing  competitiveness  for 
themselves,  but  also  advocating  it  and 
actively promoting it for others? And what 
are the implications for currently dominant 
approaches  to  understanding  the  global 
political economy?
  For the significance of this phenomenon 
to be grasped, we must put aside the tired 
and  ill-formulated  debates  that  have 
become  the  staples  of  IR/IPE  –  realism 
versus  liberalism,  the  neo-neo  synthesis, 
the  post-structuralist  and  constructivist 
challenges  to  ‘orthodox’  approaches,  the 
caricatures  of  ‘Marxist’  approaches  that 
neutralise radical  thought,  and the feeble 
and distorting light all this casts upon the 
contemporary  global  political  economy. 
The  discipline  has  reached  its  limits,  but 
happily the points at which it breaks down 
map  the  outline  of  a  new  materialist 
understanding.
  As a first step towards mapping this new 
approach,  I  outline here the elements  of 
the politics of global  competitiveness and 
the  ‘convergence  club’  model  through 
which it is advanced on what is becoming 
a genuinely universal  scale,  then address 
the implications both for IPE and for future 
research.
The Sources of Global 
Competitiveness
On 29 June  2004 OECD Chief  Economist 
Jean-Philippe Cotis spoke in Madrid at an 
Economist  Conference  on  the  topic  of 
‘Alternatives  for  stable  economic  growth: 
increasing  productivity,  greater  competi-
tiveness,  and  entrepreneurial  innovation’. 
Taking  issue  with  an  article  in  the 
Economist [2004] that painted a relatively 
optimistic picture of European productivity, 
he argued  that  the  continental  European 
economies  were  lagging  behind,  and 
urgently  needed  to  reform  their  labour 
markets and social institutions. Drawing on 
the  conclusions  of  a  recent  OECD  study 
[OECD 2003], he argued that to improve 
the  efficiency  and  productivity  of  the 
continental  European  economies  it  was 
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necessary  to  generate  ‘the  right  kind  of 
competitive pressures’:
Most importantly, product and capital mar-
kets are not open enough and therefore not 
integrated enough to generate the right kind 
of  competitive  pressures.  This  limits  the 
scope  for  specialization,  which  brings 
efficiency  gains  and  productivity  improve-
ments. In addition, for a number of conti-
nental European economies, the barriers to 
entrepreneurship manifest by the unfriendly 
environment for start-ups and relatively high 
regulatory and  administrative  burdens  are 
estimated to be among the highest in the 
OECD [Cotis, 2004: 5].
  He went  on to contrast  the laggards  – 
France,  Germany and Italy – on the one 
hand,  and  the  representatives  of  ‘best 
practice’ – the UK and the US for the most 
part – on the other. His attack was focused 
on government policies that were ‘keeping 
out  of  the  labour  force  people  who  are 
capable of working, and often willing to do 
so’ [ibid: 3], and the moral that he drew 
was  that  both  labour  markets  and  social 
institutions needed reform: 
The main  message from our  work  is  that 
structural policies that foster a high degree 
of  labour  utilization  together  with  strong 
productivity  play  a  fundamental  role  in 
determining  economic  performance.  Many 
continental European economies have been 
found to be wanting on both these fronts, 
with high unemployment, weak job creation 
and a secular decline in the number of hours 
worked  per  employee.  Against  this 
background, reforming labour markets and 
social institutions is a necessity, in our view, 
if  Europe  is  to  return  to  stronger  growth 
[ibid].
  Spain was not consigned to the laggards’ 
group, as its rate of growth was relatively 
high and its progress was promising. But it 
could not rest on its laurels: it needed to 
remove incentives in the form of generous 
state  pensions  that  discouraged  people 
from  prolonging  their  working  lives,  and 
reform its tax system to make entry to the 
labour market more attractive to women.
The Promotion of 
Global Competitiveness
Less than a year later, on 1 March 2005, 
Cotis  was  in  London,  launching  a  new 
initiative,  the  publication  of  Economic 
Policy Reforms: Going for Growth [OECD, 
2005].  With  scant  respect  for  classical 
French  notions  of  educational  discourse, 
he  asserted  that  ‘The  aim  of  “Economic 
Policy Reforms” is not just to be instructive 
or pleasant  to read,  it  is  primarily  to be 
useful  and  to  impact  both  the  public 
debate  and  the  conduct  of  public  policy’ 
[Cotis, 2005: 1]. 
  Its publication was meant to address the 
pressing  issue  of  the  ‘premature  inter-
ruption  of  economic  convergence  across 
OECD economies,’ reflected in poor labour 
productivity and a 30% gap between GDP 
per capita in France, Germany or Italy on 
the one hand,  and the US on the other. 
Systematic international comparison in the 
form  of  a  benchmarking  exercise  would 
enable countries ‘to learn from others and 
their  successes’,  and  provide  ‘a  natural 
way  to  stimulate  economic  progress  and 
convergence’.  To this  end the OECD had 
developed a set of structural indicators in 
the areas of labour and product markets. 
With others to follow, they would make it 
easier  to  ‘find  out  what  reflects  bad 
policies  as  opposed  to legitimate  societal 
choices’.  The  objective  was  to  help 
governments to make ‘appropriate’  policy 
choices. 
  However, he added, ‘Learning to situate 
oneself in order to improve is not just the 
business  of  governments  …  It  is  also 
necessary  for  the  society  at  large,  since 
there  is  no  successful  reform  without 
public  opinion  support.  And  in  many 
countries  there  is  a  need  to  win  public 
opinion’ [ibid: 2].
 These  brief  remarks  reflect  four  salient 
aspects  of  the  ‘politics  of  convergence’. 
The  first  is  the  development,  largely 
among  international  institutions,  of  a  set 
of  ‘appropriate  policy  choices’  seen  as 
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“product and capital 
markets are not open 
enough and therefore 
not integrated enough to 
generate the right kind of 
competitive pressures” 
“reforming labour markets 
and social institutions is a 
necessity, in our view, if 
Europe is to return to 
stronger growth”
generative  of  capitalist  competitiveness. 
The second is the use of  systematic  sur-
veillance,  international  benchmarking  and 
peer review as the means of promoting the 
policies  concerned  to  those  national 
governments. The third is the identification 
of  national  governments as  the  agents 
responsible for implementing change. And 
the fourth is the insistence that a key part 
of the task of national  governments is to 
shape public opinion to the logic of global 
competitiveness.
  Finally, underpinning all these points was 
the  perspective  offered  a  year  earlier, 
when  Cotis  justified  openness  on  the 
grounds that  it  created ‘the right  kind of 
competitive pressures’: competitiveness is 
to  be  promoted,  on  as  wide  a  scale  as 
possible,  for  the  disciplines  it  imposes 
upon  the  national economies  of  the 
advanced countries themselves. 
Today Europe, 
tomorrow the world
Because  competitiveness  is  promoted  in 
order to render the disciplines of capitalist 
competition  within  national  economies  to 
ever  more  inescapable,  the  politics  of 
global  competitiveness  is  not  national  or 
even regional in scope, but global. 
  Indeed,  in  launching  Going  for  Growth 
the  OECD  was  striking  out  in  a  what  it 
announced  as  a  new  direction.  It  would 
draw policy lessons from the experience of 
the OECD countries, but it would devote its 
energies  to  promoting  them  not  only 
within the OECD itself, but across the rest 
of the world. As its website now proclaims, 
in  briskly  military  terms,  the  OECD  is 
‘moving  beyond  a  focus  on  its  own 
countries and is setting its analytical sights 
on  those  countries  –  today  nearly  the 
whole  world  –  that  embrace  the  market 
economy;’ and its objective in doing so is 
‘to tightly weave OECD economies  into a 
yet  more  prosperous  and  increasingly 
knowledge-based  world  economy’  [Box 
1.1].
 So it  was,  then,  that  on 18 September 
2006  Jean-Philippe  Cotis  spoke  in  New 
Delhi to the Federation of Indian Chambers 
of Commerce  and Industry.  He described 
the  OECD  as  a  ‘convergence  club’,  ‘the 
place  where  policy  makers  from  a  wide 
variety  of  fields  meet  together  to  learn 
from  each  other  and  to  emulate  best 
practice’;  and  he  explained  the  concerns 
over ‘fading convergence’ among the thirty 
OECD  member  economies  that  prompted 
the  OECD  to  inaugurate  in  2005  ‘a  new 
type  of  economic  surveillance,  the  so-
called  benchmarking  surveillance’  [Cotis, 
2006:1]. The new OECD publication, Going 
for  Growth,  he  told  his  audience,  would 
put forward policy lessons not only for its 
own member countries,  but for  emerging 
economies such as India as well. 
  Here  was  the  Chief  Economist  of  the 
OECD,  then,  not  on  this  occasion  urging 
the lagging members of the OECD itself to 
adopt  the ‘best  practice’  exhibited  by  its 
leading reformers, but rather urging their 
competitors,  the  leaders  of  the  Indian 
business community, to outdo them. 
  Just  what  the OECD meant  by ‘putting 
the benefit  of its accumulated experience 
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Box 1.1 ‘Capitalist emulation’ at the OECD
After more than four decades, the OECD is moving beyond a focus on its own countries and 
is setting its analytical sights on those countries - today nearly the whole world - that 
embrace the market economy. The Organisation is, for example, putting the benefit of its 
accumulated experience to the service of emerging market economies, particularly in the 
countries that are making their transition from centrally-planned to capitalist systems. And 
it is engaging in increasingly detailed policy dialogue with dynamic economies in Asia and 
Latin America.
But its scope is changing in other ways too. The matrix is moving from consideration of each 
policy area within each member country to analysis of how various policy areas interact with 
each other, across countries and even beyond the OECD area. How social policy affects the 
way economies operate, for example. Or how globalisation will change the world's 
economies by opening new perspectives for growth, or perhaps trigger resistance 
manifested in protectionism.
As it opens to many new contacts around the world, the OECD will broaden its scope, 
looking ahead to a post-industrial age in which it aims to tightly weave OECD economies 
into a yet more prosperous and increasingly knowledge-based world economy.
‘History of the OECD’, at http//www.oecd.org/about (accessed 15 October 2006)
to  the  service  of  emerging  market 
economies’ was made clear in the detail of 
the presentation. Cotis drew out from the 
OECD’s benchmarking of its own members 
a  preferred  model  focused  on  promoting 
competitiveness  across  all  aspects  of  the 
economy. 
  The  package  he advocated  -  a  sound, 
stable macroeconomic environment, public 
investment in infrastructure and in primary 
and  secondary  education,  appropriate 
labour and business regulation, and trade 
openness – was a familiar one. On labour 
and  business  regulation  in  particular,  it 
was the English-speaking and Nordic OECD 
countries  that  were  offered  as  a  model. 
Labour regulation there was ‘typically less 
strict’  than  in  the  continental  European 
countries, and as a result they were much 
better able to adapt to major technological 
innovations. The same countries also had 
more competitive product markets, and as 
a  result  they  had  ‘enjoyed  a  pick-up  in 
productivity  growth  during  the  1990s, 
while countries with more pervasive anti-
competitive  barriers  …  experienced  a 
productivity slow down’ [ibid: 3-4]. 
  Against this background, the bulk of the 
presentation  was  devoted  to  issues  of 
labour regulation. Here Cotis drew on the 
recently  revised  OECD  Jobs  Strategy 
[OECD 2006], first issued in 1994, to offer 
further lessons along the same lines: the 
high  labour  taxes  ‘typically  found  in 
continental  OECD  countries’  discourage 
entry to labour markets; their early retire-
ment  benefits  encourage  early  departure 
from it; and high unemployment  benefits 
‘reduce employment.  Especially  when the 
unemployed  do  not  have  a  strong 
obligation to look for jobs’ [ibid: 5]. 
  These  policies  should  therefore  be 
reversed, in order to maximise the supply 
of  labour,  and  complemented  by  policies 
aimed  at  maximising  the  demand  for 
workers  from  employers.  Here,  again,  a 
familiar  neoliberal  message  was  offered. 
Wages should reflect levels of productivity; 
minimum  wages  should  be  ‘set  at  levels 
that  do  not  harm  job  creation’;  payroll 
taxes should be low; and stringent labour 
regulation, putting obstacles in the way of 
hiring and firing, should be avoided.
  The  specific  lessons  for  India,  to  be 
detailed in a forthcoming  OECD Economic 
Survey of  the  country,  were  that  public 
expenditure  should  be  restructured  to 
provide more investment in roads, electric 
power  and  primary  education,  and  that 
labour  and business  regulation  should  be 
radically reformed. 
  In conclusion, Cotis drew attention to the 
features  of  reform seen by public  choice 
theorists as making it difficult (diffuse and 
gradually realised benefits for groups with 
little lobbying power in contrast with easily 
identified up-front costs for well organised 
groups), and offered some handy hints for 
effective  reform  based  on  the  OECD’s 
recent  work  on  the ‘political  economy  of 
structural  reforms’:  first,  they  should  be 
bunched into packages, so that net losers 
from  one  might  be  net  winners  from 
another;  and  second,  product  market 
liberalisation should precede essential  but 
politically difficult labour market reform.
  Fig. 1: The OECD Needs You ...
  In sum, it is possible to trace, in these 
snapshots from successive years, a consis-
tent pattern aimed at the dissemination of 
policies  intended to enhance competitive-
ness  throughout  the  global  economy. 
Underlying it, as noted above, is the notion 
of a ‘convergence club’. 
  The significance of this phenomenon for 
an  understanding  of  the  contemporary 
global political economy is threefold: first, 
it is a club that all states are urged to join; 
second,  the  convergence  it  seeks  is 
systemic,  aimed  at  the  creation  of  a 
competitive  capitalist  economy  of  global 
scale, infused throughout by the disciplines 
of  capitalist  competitiveness;  and  third, 
states are simultaneously the objects and 
the  agents  of  convergence  on  the 
envisaged goal. 
  The  focus  of  all  activity  aimed  at 
promoting convergence is policy reform at 
the  level  of  the  national  state.  In  other 
words,  the  political  economy  of  global 
competitiveness  is  simultaneously sys-
temic  and  state-centred.  Its  principal 
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focus,  as  shown  above,  is  on  subjecting 
both business and labour to the disciplines 
of capitalist competitiveness. It is for that 
reason both that the state is central, and 
that  the  logic  must  operate  at  a  global 
level if it is to be effective at national level.
  At  the  same  time,  many  ‘civil  society’ 
actors  and  networks  –  the  Federation  of 
Indian  Chambers  of  Commerce  and 
Industry in this case – are engaged in the 
process of convergence.  As we shall  see, 
such  actors  and  networks  are  variously 
lobbied,  and  lobbying,  in  support  of  the 
agenda of policy reform. 
  Finally, the convergence club model (Box 
1.2) is recursive – in particular, as states 
become reliable agents, they contribute to 
the further development of the prescribed 
policy  mix,  and to its dissemination.  And 
as  its  proposed  dynamic  is  universal  in 
scope, and based on the constant striving 
of all against all, it is in principle a process 
without end, a ‘perfect machine’ for testing 
global  capitalism  to  destruction.  In  the 
circumstances, it is not a rhetorical flourish 
to  evoke  the  vision  of  the  Communist 
Manifesto.
  Precisely because the convergence club 
model  reflects a dynamic which is at the 
same  time  state-centred  and  systemic, 
and rests squarely on the logic of capitalist 
reproduction,  exponents  of  IPE  in  its 
various current formulations cannot grasp 
it. To do that, we have to appreciate the 
connections between domestic and supra-
national politics, and in particular between 
the  empowerment  of  capital  over  labour 
that  has  been  the  principal  objective  of 
neoliberal reform at national level, and the 
systematic  promotion  of  global  competi-
tiveness by governments and international 
organisations that has accompanied it. We 
must begin, though, by tracing at least in 
outline the emergence of the ‘convergence 
club’ model.
The convergence club 
model: a brief history
The  OECD’s  Going  for  Growth is  one  of 
several  contemporary  efforts  to  promote 
global  competitiveness.  Such  efforts  can 
be dated  back to the 1970s and the early 
days of the ‘neoliberal revolution’, but they 
have  gained  particular  momentum  since 
the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  set  in 
motion an accelerated phase of expansion 
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Box 1.2 The convergence club model
Objective The  creation  of  a  global  economy  permeated  throughout  by  the 
disciplines  of  competitive  capitalism  (‘the  right  kind  of  competitive 
pressures’)
A principal focus on the regulation of both business and labour in order 
to maximise the level of competition in the system as a whole 
Structure Increasingly coordinated supranational institutions engage directly and 
indirectly with states
The emerging structure is both systemic and state-centred: all states are 
included, and they are the principal agents of change
At state level national governments carry out policy reforms and seek to 
build support for them among citizens
Civil society-centred international and national networks promote and 
support state-led policy reform 
Process The  proposed  systemic  logic  is  condensed  into  a  set  of  ‘appropriate 
policy choices’
Convergence on these is promoted by a set of related processes centred 
on benchmarking, surveillance and peer review
These together constitute a systemic process of capitalist emulation
The whole system is recursive: as states become reliable agents, they 
contribute to the further development of the prescribed policy mix, and 
to its propagation
The process is universal in scale, and, in principle, has no end
of the global capitalist economy. Although 
I  have  spent  some  time in  recent  years 
exploring  the  origins  and  trajectory  of  a 
number  of  initiatives  in  these  areas  I 
cannot  offer  a comprehensive  account  of 
their evolution here (that being one of the 
prospective  outcomes  of  this  research 
project).  However,  the  period  around 
1979-1980  is  clearly  important,  with  the 
elections of Thatcher in the UK and Reagan 
in  the  United  States  in  quick  succession 
leading  to  the  implementation  of  class 
projects aimed at reasserting the power of 
capital over labour [Cammack, 2002a].
  The continental European countries were 
seen as  laggards, then as now. In fact the 
first  Global  Competitiveness  Report,  pub-
lished  by  the  World  Economic  Forum  in 
1979, focused on 16 European economies, 
although  it  was  not  until  1986  that  the 
Single  European  Act  set  in  motion  the 
process leading to the single market. The 
continental  European  economies  remain 
the focus of the politics of competitiveness 
today, but as its scope has widened, new 
competitive forces beyond Western Europe 
have been harnessed in the effort to speed 
the process of change in Western Europe 
itself. 
  These forces have been unleashed by two 
related developments, mutually reinforcing 
after  1990.  The first  is the imposition  of 
discipline  on  the  countries  of  the  Third 
World through the way in which the ‘debt 
crisis’  of  the 1980s was exploited by the 
international  institutions  and  their  allies. 
The second, of course, is the reintegration 
of  the  Soviet  Union  and  former  Eastern 
Europe into the global capitalist economy. 
It is from 1990 that the clearest evidence 
begins to accumulate  of  concerted action 
by regional and international organisations 
to promote capitalist competitiveness on a 
global scale. 
  Since that time the World Bank has been 
systematically  engaged  in  promoting  the 
proletarianisation of the world’s poor (their 
equipping  for,  incorporation  into  and 
subjection to competitive labour markets) 
and  the  creation  of  an  institutional 
framework  within  which  global  capitalist 
accumulation  can  be  sustained,  while 
simultaneously  seeking  to  legitimate  the 
project  through  policies  of  controlled 
participation  and  pro-poor  propaganda 
[Cammack,  2001a].  The  series  of  World 
Development  Reports from 1990 on is of 
fundamental significance in this respect. At 
the  same  time  as  calling  on  the  world’s 
poor to work their way out of poverty for 
one or two dollars a day, they developed 
complementary  policies  intended  to 
reorient  state  activity  in  support  of  the 
market, and shape the delivery of services 
to the its logic.  And they called explicitly 
from the beginning for the coordination of 
the activity of all agencies concerned with 
aid  and  development,  in order  to ensure 
unity  around  the  demand  for  the 
promotion  of  market-friendly  policies 
[Cammack, 2002b]. Before the turn of the 
century the World Bank had produced its 
‘Comprehensive  Development  Framework’ 
and  persuaded  the  IMF  to  revise  its 
approach  to conditionality  in order  to tie 
heavily  indebted  poor  countries  to  the 
policy matrix and continual surveillance to 
which  it  was  linked.  The  vehicle  through 
which low income countries were engaged, 
Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  Papers  to  be 
‘agreed’  and  voluntarily  implemented  by 
national  governments,  perfectly  reflected 
the centrality of those governments to the 
process and their simultaneous subjection 
to  an  uncompromising  global  logic  –  a 
case,  perhaps,  of  poor  countries  being 
clubbed  into  convergence  [Cammack, 
2002c]. 
 The principal  objective  of  this  sustained 
effort  was  the  systematic  transformation 
of  social  relations  and  institutions  in  the 
developing  world,  in  order  to  generalise 
and  facilitate  proletarianisation  and 
capitalist  accumulation  on a global  scale, 
and build  specifically  capitalist  hegemony 
through  the  promotion  of  legitimating 
schemes  of  community  participation  and 
country ownership. The principal elements 
of  the project  were developed  under  the 
joint patronage of James Wolfensohn and 
Joseph  Stiglitz  – the latter  the exponent 
not of a benign reformism at odds with the 
cold  logic  of  the  IMF,  but  of  a  ‘deep 
interventionism’  intended  to  bring  about 
more fundamental and irreversible change 
[Cammack,  2004]. It reached its apogee, 
however,  only  with  the  Machiavellian  Sir 
Nicholas Stern, successor to Stiglitz at the 
Bank as Chief Economist, and the architect 
of the current phase of the project, with its 
emphasis upon building better climates for 
investment  [Cammack,  2006a:  337-9]. 
The  title  of  the  2005  World  Bank  World 
Development Report,  A Better Investment  
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Climate  for  Everyone,  precisely  captured 
the  global  perspective  of  the  project 
[World Bank 2004].
  It is not surprising, given the significance 
of  the  reintegration  of  the  economies  of 
former  Eastern  Europe  into  the  global 
capitalist  economy,  that  the  European 
Bank of  Reconstruction  and Development 
(where Nicholas Stern was chief economist 
from 1994 to 1999) played a parallel role 
in the promotion of competitiveness.  The 
May  1990  agreement  establishing  the 
Bank  declared  that  its  purpose  was  ‘to 
foster the transition towards open market-
oriented economies and to promote private 
and entrepreneurial initiative in the Central 
and Eastern European countries committed 
to and applying the principles of multiparty 
democracy,  pluralism  and  market  eco-
nomics’  [EBRD,  1990];  and  in 1999  the 
Bank  adopted  an  operational  strategy, 
‘Moving Transition Forward’, which reflects 
key  aspects  of  the  convergence  club 
approach:  echoing the World Bank’s Com-
prehensive  Development  Framework,  it 
argued that  the ‘primary responsibility for 
shaping  the  response  to  the  transition 
challenges’  lies  with  the countries  of  the 
region themselves, and they are urged to 
foster  investment,  entrepreneurial  and 
market skills and build popular support for 
them, while the IFIs and the international 
community  will  play  a  crucial  supporting 
role [Cammack, 2006a: 335-6]. 
  The OECD ‘Jobs Strategy’ of 1994, high-
lighted  to  the  left  [OECD  1997-8:  7], 
shows the same emphasis, and underlines 
the comprehensive character of the politics 
of  competitiveness  as  it  emerged  in  the 
1990s. By February 1998, when the OECD 
was invited to submit a background paper 
to  the  G8  Growth,  Employability  and 
Inclusion  conference  held  in  London,  its 
Economics  Department  had carried  out  a 
comprehensive  review of  the experiences 
of  its  member  countries,  and  concluded 
that  ‘at  this  stage  enough  is  known  to 
permit countries to take further action to 
reduce unemployment. The constraints on 
such action today lie mostly in the political 
sphere’  [OECD, 1998]. This would be the 
context  in  which  strategies  to  propagate 
the ‘appropriate’ policies would develop in 
the present century.
  The circumstances outlined above – the 
laggardly  response  of  the  economies  of 
continental Europe to the new challenge of 
global competitiveness and the prospect of 
a  new  field  of  expansion  and source  of 
competition  to the East,  explain  too why 
the  European  Union  and  its  Commission 
have been prominent actors alongside the 
OECD and the World Bank. Following the 
entry into force of the single market on 1 
January  1993  the  Copenhagen  Council 
meeting in June set in motion the process 
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Box 1.3: OECD Jobs Strategy
• Set macroeconomic policy such that it 
will both encourage growth and, in 
conjunction with good structural policies, 
make it sustainable, i.e. non-
inflationary.
• Enhance the creation and diffusion of 
technological know-how by improving 
frameworks for its development.
• Increase flexibility of working-time (both 
short-term and lifetime) voluntarily 
sought by workers and employers.
• Nurture an entrepreneurial climate by 
eliminating impediments to, and 
restrictions on, the creation and 
expansion of enterprises.
• Make wage and labour costs more 
flexible by removing restrictions that 
prevent wages from reflecting local 
conditions and individual skill levels, in 
particular of younger workers.
• Reform employment security provisions 
that inhibit the expansion of 
employment in the private sector.
• Strengthen the emphasis on active 
labour market policies and reinforce 
their effectiveness.
• Improve labour force skills and 
competencies through wide-ranging 
changes in education and training 
systems.
• Reform unemployment and related 
benefit systems – and their interactions 
with the tax system – such that 
societies’ fundamental equity goals are 
achieved in ways that impinge far less 
on the efficient functioning of the labour 
markets.
• Enhance product market competition so 
as to reduce monopolistic tendencies 
and weaken insider-outsider 
mechanisms while also contributing to a 
more innovative and dynamic economy.
 Source: Blondal and Scarpetta, 1997-8, p. 7.
that  would  lead to the publication  of the 
White  Paper  on  Growth,  Competitiveness 
and  Unemployment  in  December,  and  at 
the same time pledged EU support for the 
countries of former Eastern Europe as they 
pursued EU membership. In his address to 
the Council, Commission President Jacques 
Delors, called for a programme of renewal: 
greater  integration  of  the  single  market, 
measures  to  boost  investment,  reduced 
taxes  on labour,  and  more  active  labour 
market  policies  [European  Council,  1993, 
Annex  1].  Here,  then,  the  promotion  of 
competitiveness within the European Union 
went  hand  in  hand  with  its  promotion 
beyond its borders, as the Council set out 
a framework for dialogue and consultation 
with  the  associated  countries  of  Central 
and Eastern Europe towards membership, 
intended  to  secure  their  full  integration 
into the single market.
  The  relevant  passage  from  the  main 
Council  report  ‘underlined the importance 
of approximation of laws in the associated 
countries to those applicable in the Comm-
unity’,  and ‘agreed that officials  from the 
associated  countries  should  be  offered 
training  in  Community  law  and  practice’ 
[ibid: 15].
  The ‘famous Delors  White  Book’,  which 
the Directorate for Employment and Social 
Affairs describes as ‘the ideological, politi-
cal and analytical  base upon which a co-
ordinated  European  approach  to  employ-
ment was to be developed’, is seen by the 
Commission itself as the starting point for 
a  new approach.  It  leads  directly  to  the 
European  Employment  Strategy  and  the 
open method of coordination’, which make 
up together,  in content  and process,  the 
‘convergence  club model’  described  here. 
Its  origins  are  traced  back  to  the  Essen 
strategy  of  1994  and  the  Amsterdam 
Treaty  of  1997  (which  obliges  members 
and  the  community  ‘to  work  towards 
developing  a  coordinated  strategy  for 
employment and particularly for promoting 
a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce 
and  labour  markets  responsive  to  eco-
nomic  change’),  and  from  there  to  the 
‘open  method  of  coordination’  itself,  the 
root institutional form of the convergence 
club model. 
  The open method of coordination,  as it 
emerged along with the European Employ-
ment  Strategy,  has  five  key  principles: 
subsidiarity, convergence, management by 
objectives,  country  surveillance  and  an 
integrated approach. It may be noted that 
in the text that follows the first listing of 
the five key principles [Box 1.3] ‘country 
surveillance’  disappears,  while  the  means 
of surveillance appear under ‘management 
by  objectives’,  while  ‘mutual  learning’ 
appears as a key principle. The point that 
surveillance,  benchmarking  and  mutual 
learning form a synergistic whole could not 
be better made.
  The significance of the open method of 
coordination  is  that  it  is  a  supranational 
strategy  for  engaging  national govern-
ments  in  reforms  intended  to  promote 
competitiveness for themselves and across 
the region as a whole. Interpretations that 
abstract away from its origins in a broadly 
conceived  employment  strategy  ‘by  no 
means  restricted to active  labour  market 
policies  but  extend[ing]  to social,  educa-
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Box 1.3: The Open Method of Coordination
The EES (European Employment Strategy) initiated a new working method at EU level, 
which was to become known as the 'open method of co-ordination'. It is based on five 
key principles: subsidiarity, convergence, management by objectives, country 
surveillance and an integrated approach. 
Subsidiarity: common objectives and outcomes are defined at supranational level, with 
states responsible for the detailed content of action. 
Convergence: commonly agreed outcomes are to be achieved through concerted 
action, in which each state contributes towards raising the overall performance. 
Management by objectives: the use of quantified measurements, targets and 
benchmarks, to allow for a proper monitoring and evaluation of progress. 
Mutual learning: the exchange of good practice and experience is a core objective.
Integrated approach: structural reforms are to be pursued not through isolated and 
dispersed actions or measures, but consistent and concerted action over a wide range 
of policies and measures.
Source: adapted from http://ec.europa.eu, Employment and Social Affairs, European Employment Strategy.
tional, tax, enterprise and regional policies’ 
simultaneously  abstract  away  from  the 
real  content  of  global  politics  in  the  21st 
century. In doing so they close off access 
to the insight that it is specifically the logic 
of  global  competitiveness  that  makes 
approaches  which  counterpose  the states 
and  supranational  institutions  misleading 
and obsolete.
The politics of 
convergence in the 
21st century
We need a new approach, then, in order to 
grasp the dynamics of global politics in the 
21st century. The starting point is to track 
the speed with which the convergence club 
model  sketched  out  above  has  become 
global in scope. It is not just that the focus 
on  competitiveness  has  become  all  but 
universal,  but  also  that  the  mechanisms 
through which it has been pursued in the 
European context – the politics of bench-
marking, country surveillance and ‘mutual 
learning’  –  have  proliferated  just  as 
quickly.
  Three brief examples – on which I have 
written elsewhere – hint at the ubiquity of 
the politics of competitiveness today:
• since the UN adopted the Millennium Goals 
at the  turn of  the century, the UNDP has 
moved to centre stage in the promotion of 
policy  reforms  intended to  build  ‘business 
climates’  and  unleash  entrepreneurship  in 
the developing world. A series of initiatives 
after 2000, centred on the adoption of the 
‘Monterrey  Consensus’  by  governments 
around the world in 2002, have tied low and 
middle income countries  to  the  agenda of 
competitiveness [Cammack, 2006b]. 
• Since 2001, when the IDB (Inter-American 
Development  Bank)  devoted  its  annual 
report to the topic of  Competitiveness: the 
Business of Growth [IDB, 2001], the efforts 
of Latin American countries to improve their 
competitiveness  have  been  actively 
supported by the IMF, the World Bank, the 
IDB, the EU, the OECD and UNCTAD. A Latin 
American  Competition  Forum  has  met 
annually since 2003, supported by the IDB 
and  the  OECD,  and  has  sponsored  peer 
reviews of competition policy in Chile, Peru, 
Brazil and Argentina [Cammack, 2004b]. 
• in 2004, following the setting up in 2002 of 
NEPAD  (the  New  African  Partnership  for 
Development) with the support  of  the G8, 
UK Prime Minister  Tony Blair assembled a 
Commission for Africa. Its 2005 report not 
only echoed the approach developed by its 
Director  of  Research,  Sir  Nicholas  Stern 
(now Chief Economist at the UK Treasury) at 
the  EBRD  and  the  World  Bank,  but  also 
showed  the  close  parallels  between  the 
promotion of competitiveness in the UK itself 
and  by  UK  agencies  and  IMF-World Bank 
networks in Africa [Cammack, 2006a].
  Other recent research adds significantly 
to the picture:
• Dannreuther argues that ‘member states of 
the  EU  have  always  depended  upon  the 
supranational  institutions  to  regulate  eco-
nomic  stability  while  relying  on  domestic 
institutions  to  regulate  social  stability’ 
[2006:  186],  and  traces  the  origins  of 
multi-level  consultation,  benchmarking and 
the  Open  Method  of  Coordination  to  the 
promotion of small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) by European Parliament’s Committee 
on  Industrial  and  Monetary  Policy,  which 
made 1982 the ‘European Year of the SME’ 
[ibid: 197].
• Nunn and Price [2004] similarly show how 
the  EU,  through  the  successive  reforms 
which led from the first Lomé Agreement in 
1975 to  the  Cotonou Agreement  of  2000, 
pioneered some of the key mechanisms of 
convergence  on  global  competitiveness  – 
from the promotion of African SMEs in the 
mid-1980s  to  the  Economic  Partnership 
Agreements  (EPAs)  that  are  the  central 
feature of the Cotonou Agreement. The EPA, 
which  commits  the  EU’s  ACP  partners  to 
remove barriers to trade and attain full WTO 
compliance, makes the Agreement a perfect 
‘convergence club’. 
• Charnock  [2006]  shows  how  the  World 
Bank’s vision of itself as a would-be ‘world 
executive  committee’  promoting  global 
competitiveness  was  played  out  both 
through the publications of the Office for the 
Chief  Economist  for  Latin America and the 
Caribbean,  and the  Bank’s involvement  in 
the national reform process in Mexico. As he 
notes,  this  ‘aspirant  “world  executive 
committee”  remains  totally  dependent  on 
national  states  to  “operationalise”  these 
reform agendas’ [ibid: 75].
• Pirie [2005, 2006a, 2006b] tracks the path 
of the Korean state from the crisis of the late 
1990s,  tracing  its  transformation  and  its 
institutionalisation of a comprehensive neo-
liberal regulatory regime. He shows that the 
‘new  Korean’  state,  always  committed  to 
developing  global  competitiveness  in  key 
areas,  is  determined  to  impose  the 
disciplines of the global market in all aspects 
of  social  and  economic  life.  Key  reform 
efforts date from the mid-1980s and mid-
1990s,  but  it  was  the  ‘Asia  crisis’  that 
provided the opportunity for thorough-going 
reform.
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  These examples provide clear evidence 
that  the  promotion  of  competitiveness 
has become a central concern for a range 
of  international  actors  and  institutions, 
some of them unlikely candidates for the 
role, as well as for states. They suggest 
that  regimes  of  governance  developed 
within the European Union, initially for its 
own members, are of crucial importance; 
that the promotion of convergence is now 
genuinely  global  in scale;  and that  it  is 
national states, supported and disciplined 
by global regimes of governance, that are 
unequivocally the principal  agents in the 
process. 
  In addition, the examples above reflect 
the spread at regional and national levels 
of  the  instruments  of  the  convergence 
club  model.  The  rapid  spread  of  sur-
veillance, benchmarking and peer review, 
through  coercive  or  cooperative  supra-
national  mechanisms,  and  close  coordi-
nation  between  national  competition 
authorities is a significant indicator of the 
extent to which broader global initiatives 
reach  down  through  different  networks 
and  levels  of  governance.  Above  all,  in 
every case, the ultimate focus is upon the 
character and effectiveness of the agency 
of the (transformed) national state.
  This  is  the  broader  context,  then,  in 
which  we  should  approach  contemporary 
supranational  initiatives  which  centre  on 
surveillance,  bench-marking,  and  mutual 
learning, and reflect the convergence club 
approach  (such  as  the  World  Economic 
Forum’s  Global  Competitiveness  Report, 
the  EU’s  Lisbon  Agenda,  and  the  World 
Bank’s  Doing Business series). Each in its 
way reflects the current state-of-the-art of 
convergence club politics.
The  Global  Competitiveness  Report is 
intended, the WEF says, ‘to help national 
economies  improve their competitiveness’ 
[http//www.weforum.org].  As  noted 
above, its first Report, produced in 1979, 
covered only  16 European  countries.  The 
2006-07  report,  the  latest  in  the  series, 
covers 125 countries and introduces a new 
Global Competitiveness Index with over 90 
variables, reflecting in full the elements of 
the  ‘convergence  club  model’  outlined 
here,  and  showing  how  the  system  of 
mutual learning and surveillance has been 
perfected in recent years. Whereas the old 
index had 35 variables  and covered only 
three  ‘key  drivers  of  growth’  (macro-
economic  environment,  quality  of  public 
institutions,  and  technology),  the  new 
index  adds  in  a  wider  range  of  factors 
‘seen as important  determinants  of  com-
petitiveness’,  such  as  the  functioning  of 
labour markets, the quality of a country’s 
infrastructure,  the state of education  and 
public health, and the size of the market’ 
[ibid].  Behind  all  the  jiggery-pokery  that 
this  entails,  the  principal  purpose  of  the 
annual league tables is to support national 
reformers, aiding and abetting the social/ 
socio-psychological  process  of  ‘locking  in’ 
described by Nunn and Price [2004: 207].
  The  trajectory  of  the  Lisbon  Agenda, 
launched by the European Commission in 
2000,  confirms  the  salience  of  national 
governments  as ‘champions  of  reform’  in 
the convergence process. Set up to make 
Europe ‘the most dynamic and competitive 
knowledge-driven economy  in the world’, 
the programme was relaunched in 2005, in 
response  to  the  Kok  Report  [European 
Commission, 2004], with national govern-
ments  now  placed  at  the  centre  of  the 
implementation  process.  National  reform 
programmes were then produced by each 
member state in October 2005, setting in 
motion  a  process  of  scrutiny  and  review 
which  perfectly  embodies  the  politics  of 
convergence  and  capitalist  emulation 
[http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs].
  In turn,  the Lisbon agenda is only  the 
most  visible  of  the  torrent  of  initiatives 
that have built upon the small beginnings 
traced by Dannreuther to 1982. The series 
of Competitiveness Reports from 1997, the 
1999 Action Plan to Promote Entrepreneur-
ship  and  Competitiveness highlighted 
below,  the  proliferation  of  sectoral 
indicators  of  competitiveness,  and  the 
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“Promoting entrepreneurship 
and innovation has moved centre 
stage in European enterprise 
policy. The creation of a business 
environment that encourages the 
creation and growth of new 
businesses and new sectors 
is a key to improving the 
competitiveness of Europe’s 
economy” 
European Commission, Action Plan to 
Promote Entrepreneurship and 
Competitiveness, 1999: 4.
scoreboards  benchmarking enterprise  and 
implementation  of  the  single  market  all 
reflect the European Commission’s leading 
role in the process.
    The World Bank’s Doing Business series, 
launched  in  2004  to  support  the  Bank’s 
private sector development agenda, offers 
further evidence of the proliferation of the 
‘convergence club’ approach. Its promotion 
of  regulation  as  a  means  of  securing  a 
good business environment with competi-
tive  labour  and  product  markets  is  in-
tended  to  encourage  poor  countries  to 
learn from and emulate  rich ones [World 
Bank, 2004: 83]. In pursuit of this goal it 
uses benchmarking to motivate reforms in 
the regulatory environment for business in 
developing countries, to inform the design 
of reforms, to provide data on which moni-
toring  could  be  based,  and  to  inform 
regulatory theory [Box 1.4]. 
  Wherever  one  looks,  then,  one  finds 
international organisations engaged in the 
promotion  of  a comprehensive  set  of  re-
forms  intended  to  equip  all  countries  to 
compete in the global economy. And as we 
shall  see  in  the  following  section,  their 
efforts are supplemented by a second tier 
of  specialist  agencies  and  networks  that 
link government agencies across the world 
with responsibility for competition policy.
Competition 
Networks
Networks  concerned with  the cooperative 
promotion  of  competition  through  the 
sharing of best practice,  peer review and 
other  similar  instruments  of  capitalist 
emulation  have  proliferated  over  recent 
years.  The OECD’s  own Global  Forum on 
Competition, meeting annually since 2001, 
is a leading example – the Latin American 
Competition  Network  mentioned  above  is 
an  offshoot  from  it.  Another  is  the  US-
inspired  International  Competition  Net-
work,  a  product  of  the Global  Forum for 
Competition and Trade Policy, founded by 
the International Bar Association in 1991. 
The  International  Competition  Network, 
set up with the support of European Com-
missioner  for  Competition  Mario  Monti, 
was set up to provide an informal  forum 
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Box 1.4 What does Doing Business aim to achieve?
• Motivating reforms through country benchmarking
Around the world, international and local benchmarking has proved to be a powerful force for 
mobilizing society to demand improved public services, enhanced political accountability, and 
better economic policy. Transparent scoring on macroeconomic and social indicators has 
intensified the desire for change—witness the impact of the human development index, 
developed by the United Nations’ Development Programme, on getting countries to 
emphasize health and education in their development strategies. The Doing Business data 
provide reformers with comparisons on a different dimension: the regulatory environment for 
business.
• Informing the design of reforms
The data analyzed in Doing Business highlight specifically what needs to be changed when 
reforms are designed, because the indicators are backed by an extensive description of 
regulations. Reformers can also benefit from reviewing the experience of countries that 
perform well according to the indicators.
• Enriching international initiatives on development effectiveness
Recognizing that aid works best in good institutional environments, international donors are 
moving toward more extensive monitoring of aid effectiveness and performance-based 
funding. The U.S. government’s Millennium Challenge Account and the International 
Development Association’s performance-based funding allocations are two examples. It is 
essential that such efforts be based on good-quality data that can be influenced directly by 
policy reform. This is exactly what Doing Business indicators provide.
• Informing theory
Regulatory economics is largely theoretical. By producing new indicators that quantify various 
aspects of regulation, Doing Business facilitates tests of existing theories and contributes to 
the empirical foundation for new theoretical work on the relation between regulation and 
development.
World Bank, Doing Business 2004, pp. ix-x.
for  competition  authorities  from  around 
the  world  to  identify  and  promote  ‘best 
practice’.  The  Statement  of  Missions  and 
Achievements’  issued  at  its  May  2006 
Annual  Conference proclaims its objective 
as to promote  convergence in competition 
laws  and  practices  through  cooperation 
between agencies. Notably, the network is 
concerned not only with the harmonisation 
and  enforcement  of  competition  law,  but 
also  with  advocacy:  the  promotion  of 
competition  culture  ‘by  influencing  those 
outside the competition agency (in govern-
ment and in the private sector) to imple-
ment  pro-competitive  policies  and  prac-
tices’ [Box 1.5].
The deep agenda of 
competitiveness
The European Union is a major source of 
the  global  politics  of  competitiveness,  in 
spite (or more likely because) of its rather 
conspicuous  absence  among  some  of  its 
leading  economies.  But  within  the  EU  it 
has  been  successive  British  governments 
that have made the running in promoting 
the disciplines of competitiveness at both 
national  and  regional  levels.  The  theme 
was prominent from the beginning of the 
Blair government – in the 1998 DTI White 
Paper  on  competitiveness  [Cammack, 
2006:  344],  and  in  the  successive  1997 
and  2000  White  Papers  on  Development 
[Cammack, 2001b]. It has been apparent 
in the stance of  the Treasury throughout 
the  tenure  of  Gordon  Brown,  and  it  has 
run  seamlessly  through  domestic  and 
foreign policy alike.
  This is strikingly apparent in two recent 
documents,  a  Treasury  pamphlet  on  the 
case for open markets, published in April 
2006,  and  the Development  White  Paper 
brought out by DFID two months later. As 
the  parallel  excerpts  highlighted  below 
suggest, both embody the politics of global 
competitiveness  as  outlined  here.  Brown 
values the single  market  for  its domestic 
effects  as  an  enforcer  of  competitive 
behaviour, and New Labour’s foreign policy 
unswervingly exhorts governments around 
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Box 1.5 The ICN: Its Goals and Working Methods
Competition agencies carry out two main functions: enforcement of the competition 
laws that apply in their jurisdiction, and advocacy, which involves promoting 
competition culture by influencing those outside the competition agency (in 
government and in the private sector) to implement pro-competitive policies and 
practices. The main goal of the ICN is quite simply to achieve better competition 
enforcement and better competition advocacy. Two main routes to this end are 
available: convergence in competition laws and practices, and co-operation between 
agencies. …. The ICN works to promote sound and principled procedural and 
substantive standards that help minimize such burdens and leave pro-competitive, 
efficiency enhancing conduct free to flourish. 
International Competition Network, ‘A Statement of Missions and Achievements up until May 2006 , at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/capetown2006/index.html (accessed 21 October 2006) 
“The creation of the Single 
Market was one of the defining 
economic achievements of the 
EU. By removing cross-border 
barriers to trade, it has helped 
to strengthen competitive 
pressure in Europe, putting 
downward pressure on prices, 
promoting enterprise and 
growth, and ensuring that 
resources are moved quickly 
towards the most productive 
areas” 
HM Treasury, 2006, p. 9, para. 33.
“It is the private sector – from 
farmers and street traders to 
foreign investors – that creates 
growth. Growth is fuelled by the 
creativity and hard work of 
entrepreneurs and workers. But as 
the Commission for Africa 
emphasised, it is governments 
that are in a position to make 
markets and competition work, by 
taking the lead in making business 
easier and less expensive, and 
determining the level of 
regulation” 
DFID, 2006, p. 58, para. 5.5.
the world to promote competitiveness. The 
broader implications for an understanding 
of  the  relationship  between  states  and 
international institutions is made explicit in 
terms  which  make  IR/IPE  approaches  to 
the  state,  and  the  ‘statism’  which  is 
generally their counterpart in the analysis 
of domestic policy, entirely redundant:
Instead of  simply reaching political  agree-
ments  on  timetables for  liberalisation  and 
market-opening legislation, Europe needs a 
process  in  which  all  sectors  which  fail  to 
liberalise  and  open up  to  competition  are 
subject  to  independent  investigation  and 
enforcement, undertaken free from national 
political  interference. Where  national  prac-
tices  are  found to  provide  barriers  to  the 
Single  Market,  the  necessary  regulatory, 
structural and competition-law based reme-
dies must be applied to drive up the levels of 
competition  [HM  Treasury,  2006,  p.  10, 
para. 39].
  This is the logic of the politics of global 
competitiveness at national level – at least 
in those governments squarely committed 
to its logic as the British government has 
been.  It  is  not  a  paradox  that  the 
government which hired Sir Nicholas Stern 
as its Chief  Economist  and commissioned 
him to write the report of the Commission 
for  Africa  should  both seek to ‘surrender 
its  sovereignty’  to  Brussels  in  order  to 
impose  all  the  more  effectively  the 
disciplines of global capitalist competitive-
ness,  nor  that  it  should  simultaneously 
draw on data from the World Bank’s Doing 
Business reports in the Development White 
Paper  to  urge  developing  countries  to 
compete and converge [DFID, 2006: para. 
5.9, p. 60].
Conclusion
I set out here with two questions: why is it 
that both the governments of the leading 
capitalist economies, and international or-
ganisations such as the OECD or regional 
associations such as the EU, are not only 
pursuing  competitiveness  for  themselves, 
but  also  advocating  and  promoting  it  for 
others? And what are the implications for 
current  approaches  to  understanding  the 
global political economy? 
  The first  question is easily  answered –
they  believe  that  the  disciplinary  forces 
that  global  competitiveness  will  unleash 
are vital to the continued sway of capital 
over labour in their own economies, and to 
the continued pressure on capital to seek 
to  be  ever  more  competitive.  In  other 
words,  global  competitiveness  is  to  be 
promoted  because  it  is  the  key  to  the 
maintenance and reproduction of capitalist 
hegemony  within  the  advanced  capitalist 
countries themselves. 
  And  in  saying  that,  we  are  saying 
something  that  the  disciplines  of  IR  and 
IPE are set up to exclude:  that  domestic 
politics  drives  global  politics,  and  that  in 
the contemporary world, in which domestic 
politics  revolves  ever  more  around  the 
need to install the logic of global capitalist 
competitiveness  at  the  heart  of  the 
domestic  political  economy,  it  is  class 
relations,  or class  struggle,  which shapes 
both domestic and global politics. 
  The  answer  to  the  second  question 
follows. Approaches that do not start from 
this  insight  cannot  understand  or explain 
the contemporary  world.  Only  a renewed 
classical  Marxism,  attuned to the circum-
stances  of  the  contemporary  world,  can 
and does. But in order to do so, it must be 
more  rather  than  less  ‘classical’  in  its 
orientation – in other words, more rather 
than  less  focused  on  the  themes  of 
accumulation  and the realisation  of  value 
through capitalist exploitation.
  It remains to give an indication of what 
this might entail,  in terms of implications 
for current debates, and outlines for a new 
research agenda.
Implications
I asserted at the outset that the points at 
which IR/IPE approaches break down ‘map 
the  outline  of  a  new  materialist  under-
standing  of  global  politics.  The  point  is 
neatly illustrated by Cerny’s recent review 
of work by Brenner and Jessop.  Cerny is 
out to persuade us that these authors are 
‘hampered  by  the  remnants  of  classical 
Marxist  analysis  they  retain’,  and  is 
particularly  hard  on  the  economic 
determinism  he  finds  lurking  in  Jessop’s 
work.  However,  he  can  neither  decide 
what he wants to put in its place, nor offer 
an  alternative  interpretation  of  global 
politics today. He argues, against the eco-
nomic  determinists,  that  capitalism  is 
‘what actors make of it’,  but allows all the 
same  that  they  make  of  it  pretty  much 
what Brenner and Jessop say they do: 
The  co-constitution  of  state  restructuring 
owes more to political projects that reshape 
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market scale and market structure – altering 
the conditions for the creation of value and 
even creating value from market processes 
themselves  –  than  to  the  extraction  of 
surplus value from the  commodification  of 
labour-power in  the  process of  production 
[Cerny, 2006: 693].
  Cerny argues that such projects can be 
explained  by non-Marxist  variables  –  the 
expansion of the market and ‘competitive 
market behaviour’, impelled in turn by the 
politics  of  embedded  liberalism.  But  he 
sketches a process in which opportunistic 
actors ‘are forced to be competitive’  in a 
process that expands to a global scale as 
‘actors  in  other  geographical  settings 
emulate market behaviour’ [ibid: 684]. In 
other  words,  he  relies  on  the  same 
structural  determinism  himself.  He  is 
caught, in other words, arguing that states 
are  being  transformed  by  the  logic  of 
competitiveness, but maintaining that this 
is  a  consequence  of  agency  rather  than 
determinism – only to restore determinism 
a  step  further  back.  It  is  not  surprising 
that, as demonstrated here in the analysis 
of the content of convergence club politics, 
the ‘political projects that reshape market 
scale  and  market  structure’  in  the  con-
temporary world do indeed reflect the logic 
of capital accumulation and the extraction 
of surplus value. Cerny, however, does not 
explore  them,  falling  back  instead,  in 
blatant  contradiction  of  what  has  gone 
before, on the claim that there is no clear 
logic  to  contemporary  political  projects, 
but rather
a kind of neomedieval world order emerging 
of competing institutions, overlapping juris-
dictions,  multiple  identities,  territorial  flux 
and  the  reduced  capacities  of  states  to 
provide order and security .., but there are 
other possibilities too [ibid: 694].
  The rejection  of classical  Marxism lead 
him straight into a formless void.
  A second example may be taken from the 
recent  issue  of  the  Journal  of  European 
Public  Policy devoted  to  the  EU and  the 
new  trade  politics,  which  is  riddled  with 
contradictions  and  dead  ends.  These  are 
overcome if what Young and Peterson see 
as the ‘intrusion  of  the multilateral  trade 
agenda behind borders’,  or a ‘deep trade 
agenda’ [2006: 795]  is seen instead as a 
deep  competitiveness agenda,  originating 
in  concerns  directly  related  to  class 
struggle  and  capitalist  discipline  that  are 
increasingly  salient  ‘beyond-the-borders’ 
because the development of capitalism on 
a global  scale  has entered a new phase. 
Young and Peterson remark in passing that
Post-1997 British governments under Tony 
Blair  particularly  pushed  a  development 
agenda  ..,  even  being  cautious  in  their 
support  for  environmental  and  labour 
standards  lest  they  harm  developing 
countries’ competitiveness [ibid: 806].
  But they do not analyse the Blair agenda 
further, so fail to notice the way in which 
this policy stance reflected an over-riding 
concern  with  competitiveness  for  Britain 
itself,  from  which  its  agenda  for  the 
developing world derived. 
  It is left to Damro to note the spread of 
competition laws, agencies and authorities 
over recent years, and the wide range of 
international  organisations  engaged  with 
them, but he adopts a ‘statist’ framework 
within which he is content to attribute the 
activity  of  convergence  and  cooperation 
around competition law he describes to the 
policy preferences of EU managers, who, it 
seems, just want a quiet life. Any deeper 
forces  driving  the  process  go  unnoticed 
[Damro, 2006; see Cammack, 1990, for a 
critique  of  the  approach].  He  is  right  to 
make  the  link  between  trade  policy  and 
competition  policy,  but  his  analysis  runs 
into trouble precisely at a point that shows 
the  power  of  the  materialist  analysis 
advocated  here,  focused  on  the  commit-
ment of governments to the maintenance 
and  enforcement  of  the  disciplines  of 
capitalist  competitiveness.  For  he  finds, 
paradoxically at first glance, that it was DG 
Trade (under Sir Leon Brittan) rather than 
DG  Competition  that  wanted  the  WTO 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism to apply to 
national competition legislation. His feeble 
explanation is that it would have been too 
much trouble for DG Competition: 
With its binding mechanisms and linkages to 
various  trade issues, the WTO proved the 
least  conducive  venue  through  which  DG 
Competition  could  promote  international 
competition policy [Damro, 2006: 882].
 He then argues, just as feebly, that DG 
Trade was interested in competition not for 
itself,  but  ‘as  a  means  to  open  markets 
and prevent private barriers from replacing 
public (tariff) barriers to trade’ [ibid], as if 
this explained why the WTO was the right 
route for them but the wrong one for DG 
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Competition. In fact, he is a victim of two 
complementary barriers to understanding. 
First,  he  starts  from  the  preferences  of 
‘supra-state’  managers  rather  than  from 
the logic of capitalist competitiveness; and 
second,  he  operates  within  an  analytical 
framework  which  treats  the  international 
or global level as separate from domestic 
politics. As always in such cases, the logic 
needs standing on its head. He could have 
looked  to  the  contribution  in  the  same 
issue from Shaffer, who says that in 1996
Sir  Leon  Brittan,  the  EU’s  liberal  Trade 
Commissioner  at  the  time,  officially 
announced the Market Access Strategy not 
before  an  audience  of  member  state 
bureaucrats, but at a business symposium to 
which he invited executives from major EU 
exporting companies [Shaffer, 2006: 835]. 
  Sir Leon looks more like an instrument of 
the bourgeoisie than an autonomous state 
actor. But traced back, his commitment to 
the promotion of trade had its roots in a 
larger  project,  unexplored  by  Damro  or 
Shaffer,  of  Thatcherite  neoliberal  reform, 
which  leads  directly  (though  Thatcher 
would  not  have  welcomed  it)  to  Brown’s 
insistence that EU competition law should 
over-ride ‘national political interference’. It 
is the politics of systemic competitiveness 
that explains the deeper roots of the new 
trade agenda.
Towards a new 
research agenda
The research agenda which emerges from 
the  politics  of  global  competitiveness  set 
out here and the convergence club model 
arising from it is extensive. In theoretical 
terms it suggests the need to break with 
the orientation and assumptions of current 
orthodox  approaches  within  IR  and  IPE, 
especially  where  they  dissociate  national 
from international politics and counterpose 
the state to supranational institutions. And 
in  empirical  terms,  it  suggests  that  far 
more  investigation  is  needed  into  the 
roots,  trajectory  and  orientation  of 
‘convergence club’ politics. In particular:
• It  confirms the value of  the application of 
key themes from classical Marxism to  the 
contemporary  global  political  economy:  a 
focus  on  the  ‘governance  of  global 
capitalism’ [Cammack, 2003].
• It  suggests  that  insofar  as  state  theory 
remains central, the focus should be on the 
transformation of national states, not on the 
emergence of a ‘transnational state’. 
• It identifies the issue of inequality as central 
to the development of capitalism on a global 
scale, not as an unfortunate by-product, but 
as a structurally determined feature of the 
process. And it locates the roots of inequality 
not  in  relations  between  states,  but  in 
capitalist exploitation.
• It identifies the European Union rather than 
the United States as the principal site of the 
politics  of  global  competitiveness  and  the 
efforts to disseminate it.
• It  provokes the  need for  further  research 
into the relations between the EU, the OECD, 
the  various  agencies  of  UN  system,  the 
Bretton  Woods  institutions  and  the 
multilateral banks.
• It provides a framework for the analysis of 
regional and national development projects 
across the world, and for comparative work 
building upon it. 
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